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SUMMARY
1The total output of imlustyjalmaterials has expandedmore rapidly
since the Start of W'o,ldWar II than in thecorresponding period of
World War 1, but the differenceis not substantial. The rise froni1914 to1917was about32per cent; from1939to1942,about 35 per cent. iiThe similarity between thetwo wars u'ith respect to therate of
expansion in the total output ofindustrial materials reflectsa cor-
responding tendencyon the part of many individual commoditiesor
groups of commodities. Constructionmaterials and products of
foreign originare exceptions: the former increased from1939to1942 but declined from1914 to1917,the latter declined between1939and
1942but increased from1914to1917.
iiiIn both wars the rate of increasein the total output of industrial
materials diminished sharply aftertwo or three years of expansion.
in the currentwar this retardation occurred between1941and 1942.
it seems unlikely that thetotal production of industrialmaterials will,
in the near future, riseappreciably above the level reachedin1942.
IVIn peacetime, over shortperiods, there isa close correspondence
between changes in theoutput of industrial materials andin total in-
dustrial production (materialsand finished products). It isnot easy
to say how close this relationshipis in wartime because of the difficulty
of measuring totaloutput. Hence it is uncertain in whatdegree our
conclusions concerning the productionof industrial materials apply
also to total industrialproduction.
The purpose of thispaper is to review the record of industrialpro.
duction in the United States duringthe current conflict (1939to date)
in the light ofour experience in World War I (1914-18),and thereby
to get a more reliable basis forexpectations as to its future behavior.
There are several reasons for believingthat our experience in World
War I will prove instructive. Inthe first place, students of business
cycles have observed thatexpansions in general business activityhave
certain elements in common; thereforeany general expansion, such
as that experienced during the first worldwar, may be expected to
provide analogies useful to theunderstanding of thecurrent expan-
sion. In the second place, it isreasonable to suppose that theexpan-
sion during the first war ismore closely analogous to the currentex-
pansion than any peacetime expansionwould be.S
In both wars one of the principal initialstimuli to expansion of
production was the placing of orders by foreignbelligerents. In World
War I these orders seem to have constitutedthe chief factor that
turned the contraction prevailing duringmost of 1913 and 1914 into
an expansion (beginning about December 1914). In World WarII
an expansion was already under way whenwar was declared in
Europe (September 1939), having begun aboutJune 1938; but the
purchases of belligerents contributed muchto its continuation. In both
wars, moreover, a further tremendous stimulus to expansioncame
with the entry of the United States intothe conllict-32 months after
the start of the firstwar and 27 months after the start of the second.
The contrast with peacetime expansionsis clear: in this country ex-
ports have ordinarily played a relativelyminor role, and there is no
peacetime equivalent to the extraordinary accelerationof demand that
comes when a nation devotes itself to war.
The change in the character of goods andservices demanded is
likewise without peacetime precedent.An outstanding feature of
peacetime cyclical expansions is theirgenerality. Roughly speaking,
the demand for and the output of nearlyeverything increases. In at
least the later phases ofa wartime expansion, on the other hand, the
demand for certain goods andservices is so great and so imperative
that the production of other goods andservices cannot be maintained.
To meet the demand for militaryequipment and men to serve in the
armed forces, the production of lessessential goods and services must
be curtailed or stopped. Such sacrificesoccurred both in this war and
the preceding, and have left their markon the Statistics of production.
The nature of the change in the characterof goods and servicespro..
duced in wartime is of sufficientinterest in itself to warrant compari-
son of the two war periods. But there isa further reason: when a
country converts its factories from the productionof peacetime goods
to the construction of instruments ofwar, does it produce more, or
less? The question would be puzzlingenough if the statistical data at
one's disposal were abundant. Unfortunatelythey are not. For World
War I the available time seriesare patently inadequate to represent
the physical output of military equipment;in both wars the extreme
variations in the direction and rate of changein the output of other
goods raise doubts concerning the adequacyof the series that purport
to represent them.
The statistical diftictiltiesmay be largely avoided if we concentrate
upon the materials used in industry rather than the finalproducts.
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SChanges in kinds of raw and seinifabricated materialsare relatively
slight compared with changes in end products, in both war and peace.
Largely because of this adaptability of materials to different ends,
series representing the production or consumption of materials are
both comprehensive and continuous. In addition, the materials are of
interest since they constitute a considerable fraction of total output
and have an important influence on the output of finished goods. In-
deed, the measurement of the input of materials is one approach to
the knotty theoretical problem involved in measuring changes in total
output when its composition is radically altered, as it is during a war.
For these reasons our study of industrial production in the two wars
is based primarily on statistics relating to materials. We have compiled
annual data for1913-19, 1932,and1937-42on the production (or
consumption) of 47 industrial materials (App. Tables1and2).
Since most of the basic materials that go into the final products of
manufacturing and construction industries, in both war and peace, are
included, an index in which these series are combined is, in a sense,
comprehensive. It must be recognized, however, that the concept of a
material is not precise. Industry is so organized that to a large extent
the 'finished' products of one enterprise are the 'raw' materials of an-
other. Although one could identify reasonably well the strictly raw
materials used in manufacturing (i.e., materials that have not yet
entered the manufacturing process), and study their production or
consumption alone, this would not fully exploit the available data,
with which one can cover at least the early stages of manufacturing.
In constructing an index of 'industrial materials production' our pur-
pose is to measure as large a segment of industrial production as we
can, and the term 'materials' merely calls attention to the fact that the
missmg parts are largely the more highly fabricated products.' Of
course, the degree to which the later stages of production are not
iThe use of the term 'production' requires explanation also, since series representing
consumption and imports of materials are included in the index. Such series are
assumed to represent the output of commodities made from the materials. The weights
applied to imports, or to agricultural materials consumed, are not the values of the
materials themselves (values produced outsidc domestic industry), but the values added
to them by manufacture. We endeavor to restrict the assumed coverage to the immediate
(semifabricated) products of the materials. However, it must be admitted that imports
of materials and their industrial use may not fluctuate concomitantly. It is dithcult to
defend, for example, our selection of the series, imports of unmanufactured rubber,
which was originally chosen on the ground that it was the only rubber' series covering
both wars. We would have done better to assume (as we did in the case of tin) that
consumption could be represented by imports in the first war, and to use a consumption
series in the second war, including consumption of secondary and synthetic rubber.
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covered differs from industryto industrysome commodities included
in our index, for example,are ready for final consumption. (This
would be true, incidentally,even if we restricted the coverage toraw
materials, since the degree of fabricationto which raw materials are
subjected varies widely.) Unfortunately,the uncertainties as to the
representativeness of our index and itscomponents cannot be entirely
removed; in the first three sectionswe confine the inquiry to industrial
materials output perse; in the final section we consider the relation
between industrial materialsoutput and total industrial production.
(Some further details concerningthe coverage and weighting ofour
index are given in Appendix A.)
ITHE RISE IN TOTAL OUTPUTOF INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS
The output of industrialmaterials in the United Stateswas consider-
ably greater at the beginning ofthe second worldwar (1939) than
at the beginning of the first (1914).Our production index (using
1939 values as weights) rises nearly 60%in the twenty-fiveyear in-
terval (Table 1, col. 3). In1939 we produced, among other things,
about twice as much steel, fivetimes as much petroleum, six timesas
much aluminum; consumed 35%more cotton and 50% more tobacco;
and imported six timesas much crude rubber as in 1914. Theoutput
of a few of the commoditiesin our index was smaller in1939 than
in 1914; this was true, forexample, of bituminous andanthracite
coal, lumber, newsprint, wheat flour,and malt liquors.
Although the 60% increase inthe total between thetwo wars is
substantial, the annualrate is less than 2% peryear, and is dwarfed
by the expansions that tookplace during bothwars. In measuring the
percentage changes in the total productionof materials in the two
wars it is not necessary to use thesame weights (values) for both
periods. We therefore base theindex for World War Ion 1914
values, which seemmore appropriate to the situation at thattime than
weights reflecting the scale ofvalues twenty-fiveyears later.2 From
1914 to 1917 the production ofindustrial materials increased32%,
or slightly less than 10% peryear, while from 1939 to 1942 itrose
35%, or slightly more than 10per year (Chart 1).In both wars
2 It is this index for WorldWar I to which we shall refer throughoutthe paper, unless the one using 1939 weights is specificallyindicated.
3 All the charts (exceptChart 5) are drawn ona semilogarithmic scale to facilitate comparison of percentage changes. InCharts 1-4 the indexes for WorldWar II are arbitrarily placed below those forWorld War I; their position in thisrespect does not indicate the actual difference inthe level of production.
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